For an ad hoc IEEE 802.11 WLAN we investigate how the stations' incentives to launch a backoff attack i.e., to configure small minimum and maximum CSMA/CA contention windows in pursuit of a larger-than-fair bandwidth share, affect a proposed capacity-fairness index (CFI). We link CFI to the network size, "power awareness," a station's perception of the other stations' susceptibility to incentives, and the way of learning how the other stations perceive the other stations' susceptibility to incentives.
CSMA/CA Game and Backoff Attack Incentives
To reflect both the total bandwidth utilization Σ n b n and Jain fairness [6] we use their product i.e., (Σ n b n ) 3 /(N⋅Σ n 
where b C is a "penalty" payoff, reflecting the fact that a greedy (yet "power aware") station in this case spends all its transmission power to no effect. If 
This approach can be termed 1-order sophisticated, as it does account for the other stations also calculating incentive measures, though neglects their use of Φ. Higherorder sophistication consists in re-applying (1) to account for the other stations using Φ, their accounting for the other stations using Φ etc. In the limit Φ is deemed common knowledge [4] . Hence, ∞-order sophisticated incentive measures solve the fixpoint-type equation (where F is defined by (1) with (p s , p g ) = Φ( I s,∞ , I g,∞ )):
A unique solution of (2) obtains e.g., if Φ is defined as follows:
Here, the function ϕ measures a station's willingness to switch from w h to w s [w g ], given (I s , I g ); it should be continuous and nondecreasing, with ϕ(0) = 0 and ϕ(∞) = 1.
If the CSMA/CA game is played, we use the expected value of CFI w.r.t. the probabilities of configuring w g , w s , and w h , determined by ∞-order incentives.
Definition 2: The noncooperative CFI, denoted n-CFI, is defined as
(recall that if all k nonzero payoffs out of N are equal then the Jain index is k/N). In reality, the other stations' susceptibility to incentives may be learned by playing the CSMA/CA game repeatedly and observing successive configuration profiles. 
Conclusion
The introduction of w g and "power awareness" changes the CSMA/CA game into one with multiple Nash equilibria i.e., without a compelling outcome. We envisage that each station then calculates common-knowledge incentives to configure w s and w g , and the corresponding probability distribution of imminent configuration profiles. Our study quantitatively illustrates a few intuitions:
• the network's ability to provide high and fair bandwidth shares to all stations diminishes as N increases, partly on account of growing contention overhead, but mostly because of the stations' limited willingness to behave cooperatively; these two factors are illustrated for the b C = −40% curve at N = 50, • incentive calculus dictates that the willingness to behave cooperatively grow with "power awareness" for fear of spending all the transmission power without getting any bandwidth share; accordingly, CFI improves as b C goes more negative, • the predictions depend on a station's perception of the other stations' susceptibility to incentives, reflected by Φ, and the learning process, reflected by δ, • each of the nl-CFI curves lies between the n-CFI ∞ and c-CFI ones; its bias towards the latter measures the chance π N of emergence of cooperative behavior; this is almost certain for small enough N assuming enough "power awareness."
Although the "penalty" bandwidth share b C was assumed constant across the stations, it is relatively easy to generalize to nonuniform "power awareness" in order to study the coexistence of devices with diverse battery lifetimes.
